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There is a growing concern over concentration and market power in a broad 
range of industrial sectors in the United States, particularly in markets served by 
digital platforms. At the same time, reports and studies around the world have called 
for increased competition enforcement against digital platforms, both by conventional 
antitrust authorities and through increased use of regulatory tools. This Article 
examines how, despite the challenges of implementing effective rules, regulatory 
approaches could help to address certain concerns about digital platforms by 
complementing traditional antitrust enforcement. We explain why introducing light-
handed, industry-specific regulation could increase competition and reduce barriers 
to entry in markets served by digital platforms while better preserving the benefits 
they bring to consumers. 
INTRODUCTION 
There is widespread concern that levels of concentration and market 
power may be rising across economic sectors in the United States.1 One area 
of particular focus has been on markets served by digital platforms. Firms in 
such markets can exhibit network effects and economies of scale.2 While these 
characteristics may be the source of significant consumer benefits, they can 
also lead these markets to “tip,” at least for a time, to a single provider.3 Under 
 
1 See, e.g., JONATHAN B. BAKER, THE ANTITRUST PARADIGM: RESTORING A COMPETITIVE 
ECONOMY 2-3 (2019); COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 48-49 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse 
.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/ERP_2016_Chapter_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/UT4R-5KLL]; 
JAY SHAMBAUGH ET AL., THE STATE OF COMPETITION AND DYNAMISM: FACTS ABOUT 
CONCENTRATION, START-UPS, AND RELATED POLICIES 1-3 (2018), https://www.brookings.edu 
/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/ES_THP_20180611_CompetitionFacts_20180611.pdf [https://perma.c 
c/URZ8-3P4G]; Carl Shapiro, Protecting Competition in the American Economy: Merger Control, Tech 
Titans, Labor Markets, 33 J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2019, at 69, 69-72. 
2 JACQUES CRÉMER ET AL., EUR. COMM’N, COMPETITION POLICY FOR THE DIGITAL ERA 
2 (2019), https://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/kd0419345enn.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/3QRP-V74L]. 
3 STIGLER CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE ECON. AND THE STATE, COMMITTEE FOR THE 
STUDY OF DIGITAL PLATFORMS: MARKET STRUCTURE AND ANTITRUST SUBCOMMITTEE 12 
(2019), https://research.chicagobooth.edu/-/media/research/stigler/pdfs/market-structure-report.pdf 
?la=en&hash=E08C7C9AA7367F2D612DE24F814074BA43CAED8C [https://perma.cc/GD88-9X 
NM] (“[T]he platforms with which this report is most concerned demonstrate extremely strong 
network effects, very strong economies of scale, remarkable economies of scope due to the role of 
data, marginal costs close to zero, drastically lower distribution costs than brick and mortar firms, 
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certain conditions, market position can be quite durable once attained; the 
same factors that cause the market to tip to a single provider might also 
increase barriers to entry for potential competitors.4 Furthermore, when a 
wide range of firms in the same or related industries use the services of digital 
platforms as inputs into their own businesses or produce complementary 
products for the platform, the platform’s management and access policies can 
affect those third-party developers. Concerns over the effects of such policies 
have led, as examples, to advocacy to break up Amazon, government 
investigations and private lawsuits against Google, Facebook, and Apple.5 
While we take no position on the merits of specific cases or investigations, 
such actions illustrate how concerns about competition and innovation have 
contributed to enhanced antitrust attention to the activities of digital 
platforms. 
This Article describes how regulation could usefully supplement general-
purpose antitrust laws to address the competition policy challenges of digital 
platforms. Antitrust scrutiny and enforcement against digital platforms have 
been the subject of several prominent studies and government reports around 
the world, including from the United Kingdom,6 European Commission,7 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC),8 French 
Competition Authority,9 and the United States.10 In addition to calling for 
 
and a global reach. Markets with these combined features are prone to tipping.”); JASON FURMAN 
ET AL., UNLOCKING DIGITAL COMPETITION 4 (2019), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk 
/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/785547/unlocking_digital_competition_f
urman_review_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/XL5N-88LN]; Lina M. Khan, The Separation of Platforms 
and Commerce, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 1035 (2019). 
4 FURMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 88; Khan, supra note 3, at 1035. High consumer switching 
costs also contribute to the durability of market power in many markets served by digital platforms. 
FURMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 35-37; Sean Lyons, Measuring the Effects of Mobile Number Portability 
on Service Prices, 2 J. TELECOMM. MGMT. 357, 357-68 (2010). 
5 See Khan, supra note 3, at 1056, 1061, 1082 (describing examples of dominant providers 
leveraging their platforms by engaging in anticompetitive cross-financing practices to underprice 
competitors and privileging owned content over rival content). 
6 FURMAN ET AL., supra note 3. 
7 CRÉMER ET AL., supra note 2. 
8 AUSTL. COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMM’N, DIGITAL PLATFORMS INQUIRY (2019), 
https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Digital%20platforms%20inquiry%20-%20final%20report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZK3C-ZU3G]. 
9 AUTORITÉ DE LA CONCURRENCE, CONTRIBUTION DE L’AUTORITÉ DE LA 
CONCURRENCE AU DÉBAT SUR LA POLITIQUE DE CONCURRENCE ET LES ENJEUX NUMÉRIQUES 
(2020), https://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/sites/default/files/2020-02/2020.02.28_contribution 
_adlc_enjeux_num.pdf [https://perma.cc/NP7N-2WXC]. 
10 STIGLER CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE ECON. AND THE STATE, supra note 3; see also 
HAROLD FELD, ROOSEVELT INST., THE CASE FOR THE DIGITAL PLATFORM ACT: MARKET 
STRUCTURE AND REGULATION OF DIGITAL PLATFORMS (2019), https://www.public 
knowledge.org/assets/uploads/documents/Case_for_the_Digital_Platform_Act_Harold_Feld_2019.
pdf [https://perma.cc/9P3F-YRLJ]. 
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stronger application within existing enforcement frameworks, these reports 
also consider new regulatory approaches that go beyond the existing 
institutional and statutory confines of antitrust enforcement. Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) Commissioner Rohit Chopra, among others, has 
expressly advocated a more regulatory approach to antitrust enforcement in 
recent writings.11 The United Kingdom has already begun to increase the 
regulatory authority of Ofcom over Internet-related businesses,12 and the 
ACCC report expressly recommends a greater role for other Australian 
regulatory agencies in governing digital platforms.13 
Both authors come to the topic of this Article with experience in 
regulatory agencies and with practical understanding of the difficulties and 
potential drawbacks of regulation. We nonetheless find three main reasons 
why, despite the challenges in getting regulation right, limited regulation 
might have advantages over traditional antitrust adjudication in the context 
of large-scale industries with network effects. First, and at the broadest level, 
the adjudicative model for antitrust enforcement and doctrinal development 
has been met with well-founded criticism. This does not mean that regulation 
is the right alternative, but it does provide a good reason to ask whether under 
some circumstances a different approach might lead to better outcomes. 
Second, traditional antitrust remedies might not effectively address the 
competitive challenges of digital platform markets. Neither structural 
remedies like break-up or divestiture, nor the limited kinds of conduct 
remedies that antitrust courts and agencies have been willing or able to 
implement, can effectively reduce barriers to competition without 
diminishing network benefits for consumers. In contrast, an expert agency 
can potentially bring the experience and resources required to make more 
granular, detailed decisions about the costs and benefits of certain types of 
commercial behavior. Third, because of network effects, conduct that courts 
ordinarily judge under antitrust law’s general rule of reason might have 
different presumptive effects, and therefore be better governed by a more 
specific set of standards, in digital platform industries. An expert agency 
 
11 FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC-2018-0074, HEARING #1 ON COMPETITION AND CONSUMER 
PROTECTION IN THE 21ST CENTURY, COMMENT OF FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSIONER ROHIT 
CHOPRA 4-9 (2018) [hereinafter CHOPRA COMMENT]; see also Sandeep Vaheesan, Resurrecting “A 
Comprehensive Charter of Economic Liberty”: The Latent Power of the Federal Trade Commission, 19 U. 
PA. J. BUS. L. 645, 650 (2018) (underscoring Congress’s intent in enacting the FTC Act to expand 
the FTC’s power to police practices that “injure consumers, prevent rivals from competing on the 
merits, and allow large corporations to dominate our political system”). 
12 U.K. HOME OFFICE & DEP’T FOR DIG. CULTURE, MEDIA & SPORT, ONLINE HARMS 
WHITE PAPER (2020), https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/online-harms-white-paper 
/public-feedback/online-harms-white-paper-initial-consultation-response#executive-summary 
[https://perma.cc/D4HC-FZQE]. 
13 AUSTL. COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMM’N, supra note 8, at 140-42. 
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might be particularly suited to determine when “outer-boundary” theories of 
harm that courts rightly disfavor for general application—theories of harm 
like predation, refusals-to-deal, or acquisition of nascent competitors—
should apply in specific contexts. 
Below, we discuss why certain forms of what we call “light handed pro-
competitive” (LHPC) regulation could increase levels of competition in 
markets served by digital platforms while helping to clarify the platforms’ 
obligations with respect to interrelated policy objectives, notably privacy and 
data security. Key categories of LHPC regulation could include 
interconnection/interoperability requirements (such as access to application 
programming interfaces (APIs)), limits on discrimination, both user-side and 
third-party-side data portability rules, and perhaps additional restrictions on 
certain business practices subject to rule of reason analysis under general 
antitrust statutes. These types of regulations would limit the ability of 
dominant digital platforms to leverage their market power into related 
markets or insulate their installed base from competition. In so doing, they 
would preserve incentives for innovation by firms in related markets, increase 
the competitive impact of existing competitors, and reduce barriers to entry 
for nascent firms. 
The regulation we propose is “light handed” in that it largely avoids the 
burdens and difficulties of a regime—such as that found in public utility 
regulation—that regulates access terms and revenues based on firms’ costs, 
which the regulatory agency must in turn track and monitor. Although our 
proposed regulatory scheme would require a dominant digital platform to 
provide a baseline level of access (interconnection/interoperability) that the 
regulator determines is necessary to promote actual and potential 
competition, we believe that this could avoid most of the information and 
oversight costs of full-blown cost-based regulation, for reasons we will discuss 
below.14 The primary regulation applied to price or non-price access terms 
would be a nondiscrimination condition, which would require a dominant 
digital platform to offer the same terms to all users. Such regulation would 
not, like traditional rate regulation, attempt to tie the level or terms of access 
to a platform’s underlying costs, to regulate the company’s terms of service to 
end users, or to limit the incumbent platform’s profits or lines of business. 
Instead of imposing monopoly controls, LHPC regulation aims to protect 
and promote competitive access to the marketplace as the means of governing 
firms’ behavior. In other words, its primary goal is to increase the viability 
and incentives of actual and potential competitors. As we will discuss, the 
Federal Communication Commission’s (FCC) successful use of similar sorts 
 
14 See infra Part II. 
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of requirements on various telecommunications providers provides one 
model for this type of regulation.15 
There are several possible sources for digital platform regulation. 
Congress could enact new legislation that creates an entirely new regulatory 
agency for digital platforms or could give new statutory authority to an 
existing agency. Alternatively, the FTC could promulgate competition rules 
under authority that it arguably already has under the FTC Act of 1914. 
Several commentators have argued that the FTC could use its existing 
statutory authority under the FTC Act to issue broad, antitrust rules that 
apply generally, to all industries.16 A much more limited, and perhaps less 
controversial, manner in which the FTC could begin to use this authority 
would be to pass narrower rules that apply only to specific kinds of conduct 
and only to digital platform industries. Calls to regulate digital platforms 
involve several issues that do not centrally fall within the purview of antitrust, 
notably privacy and control over certain kinds of harmful content.17 To the 
extent there could be trade-offs among regulatory goals—for example 
between a platform’s interconnecting with rivals but limiting those rivals’ 
access to user data, or between providing nondiscriminatory access to third-
parties but blocking those that spread harmful content—there could be 
economies of scope to having a single agency address those issues, or at least 
mandating that agencies coordinate inter-related rulemaking. 
Part I of this Article discusses why potential shortcomings of the 
evolution and application of antitrust doctrine through the courts should lead 
policy makers to consider supplementing the traditional adjudicative model 
of U.S. antitrust enforcement in limited circumstances. That Section will 
then set out some basic principles for the choice of regulatory tools for 
enforcing competition. Part II discusses the rationale for LHPC regulation 
in markets served by digital platforms and describes the form these 
regulations might take in more detail. It also explains why FCC regulation of 
telecommunications providers provides a useful precedent for this type of 
regulation. Part II furthermore addresses other areas of conduct to which 
regulation might govern digital platform competition and addresses in those 
contexts the comparative strengths and weakness of case-by-case adjudication 
by generalist courts and an expert agency regulatory process. 
 
15 Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries 
Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1349-58 (1998). 
16 CHOPRA COMMENT, supra note 11, at 4-9; Vaheesan, supra note 11, at 650. 
17 See, e.g., FELD, supra note 10, at 6, 8-9 (introducing a “regulatory toolkit” for Congress to 
consider when regulating behavior on digital platforms and discussing the specific models and 
methods that can be employed to moderate content on online platforms). 
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I. GOING BEYOND ADJUDICATION FOR ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 
Antitrust statutes are primarily enforced in court, usually through the 
adjudication of specific cases or settlement against the backdrop of court-
made antitrust doctrine. Indeed, despite statutory authority for the FTC to 
issue competition rules, and despite the technical complexity of many 
antitrust cases, antitrust enforcement and policy in the United States has 
evolved primarily through precedent developed by generalist courts, not 
specialized agencies.18 To be sure, the Department of Justice and the FTC 
influence policy through the investigations they pursue and the consent 
decrees they reach with parties. The FTC itself adjudicates some cases, 
although it does so largely according to law developed in the federal courts, 
to which parties can appeal any FTC decision.19 Academics and other 
commentators have also affected the evolution of antitrust in the United 
States, from supporting an economic, notably price-focused framework for 
U.S. competition policy to sparking a rethinking of that framework in 
contemporary debates. As the courts have absorbed such learning, antitrust 
doctrine has evolved over the decades through the push and pull of precedent 
across the United States judicial circuits, with the Supreme Court 
periodically stepping in to correct, clarify, or resolve differences among the 
lower federal courts. Commentators often cite antitrust as a rare example of 
“federal common law” in the U.S. system.20 
The adjudicatory model for implementing antitrust enforcement has 
several key attributes, which in turn have both advantages and disadvantages. 
We put aside for now the question of who is adjudicating—whether it be an 
expert tribunal or a court of general jurisdiction, for example—and focus on 
three characteristics of antitrust adjudication itself. 
A. Case-by-Case, Fact-Specific Approach 
Complexity of underlying issues aside, adjudication is well suited to 
settings in which applicability of the law is contingent on case-specific facts. 
With the exception of the limited conduct that the antitrust laws prohibit per 
se, courts review most business activities through a rule of reason, under 
which some conduct that is illegal in one set of circumstances is allowable in 
 
18 See Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Courts: Specialists Versus Generalists, 
36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 788, 789-90 (2013) (comparing “generalist courts” in the United States with 
the “more specialized model[s]” found in Portugal, France, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and India). 
19 See id. (“[T]he twelve Circuit Courts of Appeals . . . review the decisions of the Federal 
Trade Commission.”). 
20 See, e.g., Justin Hurwitz, Administrative Antitrust, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1191, 1217 (2014) 
(“[A]ntitrust is generally accepted as a form of federal common law.”). 
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another.21 The inquiry into liability goes beyond whether particular conduct 
in fact occurred (which is the extent of the inquiry into conduct that is illegal 
per se) and extends into a balancing of the conduct’s likely effects on 
competition.22 The more that liability is contingent on such case-specific 
facts, the more difficult it is to determine liability in advance of the conduct’s 
having taken place. Adjudication typically occurs when conduct either is 
imminent or has already occurred, at which point the relevant facts as to the 
effects of the conduct are, in principle, more readily measured.23 Such “ex 
post” mechanisms of enforcement can reduce the risk of over-enforcement 
when compared to alternative approaches, like some forms of regulation, that 
spell out more comprehensively in advance what conduct is illegal.24 
Reducing false positives, however, may or may not be a virtue—that 
calculation depends on the extent to which particular adjudicative institutions 
and processes under-enforce by allowing harmful conduct or transactions to 
slip through the liability screen. 
B. Slow, Usually Predictable Doctrinal Development 
A second attribute of the American adjudicatory process for antitrust is 
stability. While antitrust doctrine has occasionally swerved abruptly over the 
past century, the common-law process through which antitrust law has 
developed usually provides clear notice that a change is coming. As a recent 
example, the Supreme Court’s shift in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. 
PSKS. Inc.25 from per se liability to a rule of reason for resale price 
maintenance likely caught few observers by surprise.26 
Antitrust adjudication’s stability, like its suitability for fact-dependent 
situations, is potentially double-edged. Antitrust jurisprudence can be slow 
to adjust to changes in economic learning or changes in the underlying 
economy that alter the effects of a particular kind of business conduct. For 
 
21 CHOPRA COMMENT, supra note 11, at 2; Vaheesan, supra note 11, at 667. 
22 See CHOPRA COMMENT, supra note 11, at 2 (“The ‘rule of reason’ applies a broad and open-
ended inquiry into the overall competitive effects of particular conduct and asks judges to weigh all 
of the circumstances of a case to decide whether the practice at issue violates the antitrust laws.”); 
Vaheesan, supra note 11, at 667 (“For a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case under the rule of 
reason, it must typically show actual or likely anticompetitive effects from the conduct being 
challenged.”).  
23 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Rulemaking Versus Adjudication: A Psychological Perspective, 32 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 529, 544 (2005) (“[A]djudicative bodies act retrospectively and will thus always have 
injured victims or aggrieved parties before them.”). 
24 See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Modes of Regulatory Enforcement and the Problem of Administrative 
Discretion, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1275, 1325 (1999) (discussing problems of over-enforcement in 
connection with the ex ante enforcement authority of the FDA). 
25 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
26 See Shapiro, supra note 1, at 81; infra text accompanying notes 44–45. 
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example, nearly thirty years ago the Supreme Court in Brooke Group v. Brown 
& Williamson Tobacco Corp.27 required that plaintiffs claiming predatory 
pricing show not only prices below some measure of incremental cost, but 
also that the defendant could recoup its losses.28 No plaintiff has prevailed in 
a predatory pricing case in a U.S. federal court since.29 That outcome might 
not be of concern were it the case that the Supreme Court’s test accurately 
captures the incidence of predatory pricing.30 Economic research 
demonstrates, however, that predatory conduct does occur and does not depend 
on either below-cost pricing or recoupment.31 Predation is just one area in 
which court-made doctrine appears out of step with relevant economic facts 
and knowledge. To be sure, other forces could accelerate the common-law 
process of doctrinal development. For example, Congress could legislate 
changes to the scope, presumptions, and other parameters of antitrust law in 
ways that would immediately alter precedent and bind the courts going 
forward.32 In practice, however, such intervention is rare and unlikely, making 
significant lags in doctrine a reality of antitrust adjudication in the courts. 
C. Market-Driven Case Selection 
In the United States, most adjudicative bodies do not select the cases that 
come before them. To be sure, courts have jurisdictional limitations that 
prevent them from hearing certain kinds of cases, and doctrines exist that 
allow courts to reject weak or poorly conceived complaints. Beyond those 
mechanisms, however, independent parties decide when and whether to 
pursue litigation as method of relief. One potential virtue of this separation 
between decisionmaking and case selection is that the market can drive the 
focus of judicial attention. Assuming the most widespread and most 
troublesome anticompetitive conduct will receive the greatest investment of 
litigation resources, that conduct will in turn receive the most adjudication 
and doctrinal development. 
 
27 Brooke Grp. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993). 
28 See Shapiro, supra note 1, at 81. 
29 Patrick Bolton et al., Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J. 2239, 
2241 (2000). 
30 See, e.g., id. at 2242-49 (collecting sources describing predatory pricing as “inherently 
uncertain,” and “generally implausib[le]”). 
31 See, e.g., Aaron S. Edlin, Stopping Above-Cost Predatory Pricing, 111 YALE L.J. 941, 943 (2002) 
(arguing that although below-cost pricing and recoupment “may be sufficient to make out a 
predatory pricing case . . . they should not be necessary”). 
32 See Hurwitz, supra note 20, at 1194-95 (“Congress can set other, non-economically efficient 
priorities that trump antitrust’s normative goal. These policy choices are within the domain of 
Congress and its agencies.”). 
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Unfortunately, the separation between adjudication and case selection will 
not necessarily lead to an efficient match between judicial attention and the 
most pressing antitrust violations. In practice, even conduct that is clearly 
prohibited can persist when offenders think detection is difficult; one only has 
to look at the consistently high number of civil and criminal price fixing cases 
that wind up in court, even though that conduct has clearly been illegal per se 
for nearly a century.33 The most widespread anticompetitive conduct might not 
therefore be the conduct most in need of doctrinal development—it can be just 
the opposite, as the persistence of cartels demonstrates.34 Moreover, if the 
courts develop doctrine that needs revisiting, but that deters the government 
or private plaintiffs from filing cases,35 then the market for judicial attention to 
antitrust conduct will not work well dynamically; once doctrine is settled, there 
may be no mechanism outside of legislation or regulatory intervention to drive 
doctrinal change. We return to this issue below. 
D. Generalists versus Industry Experts 
Returning to an issue we put aside earlier, who is doing the adjudication 
can matter for substantive outcomes. In U.S. antitrust law, that adjudication 
has occurred, at least ultimately, in generalist federal courts. That 
institutional locus might well make sense given the wide variety of conduct, 
industries, and factual circumstances that antitrust cases present. However, 
as specific industries come to pose particular challenges for antitrust 
enforcement, the case for more specialized enforcement decisionmakers 
becomes stronger. Traditionally, where detailed, industry-specific knowledge 
is required to make sound competition policy decisions, Congress has 
assigned authority over those decisions, at least in part, to industry-specific 
regulatory agencies. Thus, the Securities and Exchange Commission has 
authority over competitive conduct in key financial sectors.36 The FCC has 
parallel authority with the Department of Justice (DOJ) over 
telecommunications mergers and sole authority to establish terms for 
competitive entry into various telecommunications markets.37 State 
 
33 See Shapiro, supra note 1, at 72 (noting that the Department of Justice “has assessed roughly 
$10 billion in criminal fines and penalties” in price-fixing charges). 
34 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Division Update, Spring 2019 (Mar. 26, 2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/division-operations/division-update-spring-2019/cartels-beware [https: 
//perma.cc/W257-JMAD] (listing pending cartel investigations, including over ninety pending 
grand jury investigations). 
35 See supra Section I.B. (discussing predatory pricing). 
36 See Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 283-84 (2007). 
37 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 214, 310, 521(6), 532, 536 (2018) (outlining statutory requirements for 
the extension of telecommunication lines, license ownership, and cable channels for commercial use 
to maintain competition in cable communications). 
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regulators govern entry into hospital markets through Certifications of Public 
Need.38 The federal courts have increasingly safeguarded the domain of 
industry specific regulators over competition issues even when agency 
decisions might be in tension with antitrust law.39 
As antitrust enforcement focuses on distinct challenges posed by a 
particular industry, whether digital platforms, pharmaceuticals, or something 
else, expert and specialized knowledge becomes even more essential to 
making good enforcement decisions. Under current law and enforcement 
frameworks, there is no systematic way to bring such specialization into the 
ultimate adjudication of antitrust cases in industries not already covered by 
specific, competition-related, regulatory statutes. To be sure, the FTC and 
DOJ have divisions that specialize in various industrial sectors in which they 
have considerable expertise. Those divisions bring that expertise into their 
review of conduct and transactions, but neither the FTC nor DOJ has 
ultimate adjudicative authority over the cases they choose to litigate. The 
DOJ must go to federal court to seek enforcement. The FTC can opt for an 
administrative enforcement mechanism with the Commission itself sitting in 
appellate review of initial adjudication by an administrative law judge. The 
Commission’s decision is, however, subject to review by federal appellate 
courts, which have not hesitated to reverse the agency’s decisions.40 The result 
is that, even when agencies have brought specific industry expertise into 
antitrust enforcement, doctrinal application and resolution still proceeds 
through the common-law process of adjudication by generalist judges. 
E. Tradeoffs Inherent in the Adjudicatory Approach to Antitrust 
As the foregoing discussion suggests, the ex post case-by-case approach, 
slow doctrinal evolution, and case selection mechanism of antitrust 
adjudication have potential advantages and disadvantages. The tradeoffs 
become particularly clear through the interaction of those three characteristics. 
 
38 E.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2801-A(3) (McKinney 2019) (“The public health and health 
planning council shall not approve a certificate of incorporation, articles of organization, or 
application for establishment unless it is satisfied . . . as to (a) the public need for the existence of 
the institution at the time and place and under the circumstances proposed.”). 
39 See Howard A. Shelanski, The Case for Rebalancing Antitrust and Regulation, 109 MICH. L. 
REV. 683, 693-718 (2011) (discussing cases in which the U.S. Supreme Court has demonstrated that 
“[it] will interpret the substantive scope of antitrust liability narrowly in regulated settings even 
where Congress has expressly preserved the operation of antitrust law”). 
40 See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 759 (1999) (finding the FTC’s level of 
analysis evaluating anticompetitive advertising restrictions to be insufficient); LabMD, Inc. v. FTC, 
894 F.3d 1221, 1224 (11th Cir. 2018) (vacating an FTC cease and desist order applied to a data-security 
program based on what the court considered an improper interpretation of Section 5(a) of the 
FTCA); Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 459 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (reversing an FTC finding of 
monopolization). 
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Adjudication may mitigate the rate of false positives or false negatives 
obtained through enforcement, as proceeding case-by-case is less likely to 
bring about those results than are general rules that impose limits on business 
conduct in advance, regardless of specific circumstances. Broad ex ante 
specifications could prohibit beneficial or harmless conduct, and narrow ex 
ante specifications could fail to prevent anticompetitive practices. As a 
decisionmaking process moves from strict ex ante prescription to pure case-
by-case adjudication, particular facts and circumstances increasingly 
predominate over generic categorization of conduct.41 In principle, the 
movement along that spectrum enables the decisionmaker to avoid under-
inclusiveness or over-inclusiveness of categorical rules.42 
The extent to which an adjudicator actually succeeds in reducing 
enforcement errors in either direction depends on the doctrine and precedent 
through which it evaluates the case-specific evidence. Doctrine and precedent 
will determine how a court allocates burdens, prioritizes facts, and weighs 
presumptions in evaluating the legality of conduct. If precedent provides 
mistaken guidance on those factors, case-specific adjudication might do no 
better a job than ex ante prohibitions in avoiding errors or bias toward either 
under or over-enforcement. For this reason, the evolutionary pace of 
doctrinal development through antitrust adjudication is very important. 
Where that evolution has been toward convergence with state-of-the-art 
analysis and evidence as to the effects of conduct, doctrinal stability is a 
virtue. Reasonable people disagree over the Supreme Court’s movement from 
per se illegality to rule of reason treatment of vertical price restraints, as 
Justice Breyer’s dissent in Leegin demonstrates.43 The decision in that case 
nonetheless drew on a body of legal and economic analysis that, over decades, 
had continually narrowed the application of per se rules to vertical conduct 
and led logically (even if some might argue incorrectly) to the majority’s 
conclusion.44 Many commentators might therefore say Leegin is a good 
example of where the evolution of doctrine through adjudication worked well: 
stakeholders had notice and the doctrine moved in an internally consistent 
direction. While it is debatable whether the per se rule against restraints on 
 
41 See Rachlinski, supra note 23, at 544 (“Adjudicative bodies act retrospectively and will thus 
always have injured victims or aggrieved parties before them.”). 
42 See Daniel T. Deacon, Common Carrier Essentialism and the Emerging Common Law of Internet 
Regulation, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 133, 136 (2015) (noting that reliance on ex post enforcement may lead 
to under-enforcement). 
43 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 916 (2007) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (“How easily can courts identify instances in which the benefits are likely to outweigh 
potential harms? My own answer is, not very easily.”); see also Vaheesan, supra note 11, at 669 n.144 
(citing the same language from Justice Breyer’s dissent in Leegin). 
44 See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 900-02 (explaining how rulings in recent cases justify limiting the 
reach of a per se rule and promoting instead a rule of reason evaluation). 
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intra-brand competition has in recent years led to over-enforcement, there is 
a good case that it had done so in the past,45 so that the doctrine plausibly 
moved in an error-reducing direction. 
However, where doctrine gets on the wrong track, the application of 
precedent will perpetuate rather than reduce enforcement errors. In the case 
of predation, for example, there is a good argument that, in the light of 
current economic knowledge, the Brooke Group decision has led to under-
enforcement.46 The potential case-by-case advantages of adjudication are lost 
where judicial precedent renders important facts and circumstances 
irrelevant. In such cases, the relatively slow process of doctrinal correction 
through common law evolution is harmful to sound antitrust enforcement. 
The discussion above shows that the error-reducing potential of a case-
by-case, adjudicatory approach to antitrust enforcement depends heavily on 
the actual doctrine courts apply and on the process by which that doctrine 
evolves. Similarly, whether case selection in an adjudicatory approach in fact 
directs judicial attention to the conduct that most warrants oversight depends 
on existing doctrine and precedent. It may well be that the conduct doing the 
most harm is also the conduct for which the courts impose the highest 
burdens of proof on plaintiffs. The deterrent effect of those burdens likely 
leads to fewer cases than the conduct’s actual effects warrant.47 Similarly, 
doctrine that too readily imposes liability could have the opposite effect: 
lower barriers for plaintiffs would lead to too many cases and more devotion 
of judicial resources than the conduct deserves.48 Like error-reduction, the 
distribution of antitrust cases brought for adjudication depends heavily on 
the state of the doctrine and on the ability of the common law process to 
correct course where necessary. 
The potential disadvantages of antitrust adjudication by generalist courts 
raise the question of whether a different approach might be preferable, 
specifically with regard to digital platforms. Digital platforms present 
relatively novel challenges. Considering the tenuous fit between some 
 
45 See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 607-12 (1972) (holding that an association 
engaged in a per se violation of the Sherman Act even in the absence of price fixing and even though 
the district court determined as a factual matter that the activity at issue had fostered competition). 
46 See Bolton et al., supra note 29, at 2242-49 (“To summarize, present judicial skepticism about 
predatory pricing assumes that predation is extremely rare, but sound empirical and experimental 
studies as well as modern economic theory, do not justify this assumption.”). 
47 See, e.g., James Langenfeld & James Morsch, Refining the Matsushita Standard and the Role 
Economics Can Play, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 507, 512 (2007) (noting that heightening the burden at the 
pleading stage in horizontal antitrust conspiracy cases “would likely discourage potential meritorious 
cases”). 
48 See Mark Anderson & Max Huffman, Iqbal, Twombly, and the Expected Cost of False Positive 
Error, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 4 (2010) (discussing the social costs of false positives where 
relaxed standards permit plaintiffs to proceed with non-meritorious claims). 
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potential theories of harm and current antitrust doctrine, the complexity of 
the underlying technical issues in antitrust cases, and the interrelatedness of 
those issues and adjacent policy goals, a more informed, comprehensive 
approach coordinated by an expert regulatory agency might foster more 
advantages than does the exclusive resort to traditional antitrust adjudication. 
However, before we turn to the form such regulation might take, we briefly 
identify some general principles for such regulation. 
F. A Regulatory Alternative 
Whether or not regulators take action against an alleged monopolist 
should depend on two things: first, whether the monopoly power meets 
criteria of economic harm, durability, and remediability; and second, whether 
available regulatory mechanisms are in fact likely to remedy the monopoly’s 
harms without creating equally harmful side effects for consumers. Without 
satisfying those conditions, there may not be any case for regulation at all. 
We must take as a baseline that regulation will always carry administrative 
costs and create inefficient distortions. If that is the case, then even in some 
highly imperfect competitive conditions, allowing market forces to drive 
entry and innovation over time could produce higher net benefits than 
regulation would. However, when monopoly harms are not remediable ex 
post and where monopoly power is durable, the cost-benefit calculation shifts 
in the direction of regulatory intervention. The case for intervention then 
depends not on the nature of the harm (irreparable, long-term) but on the 
efficacy of available regulatory tools. With respect to this criterion, not all 
regulatory mechanisms are equal. Indeed, as we will discuss below, available 
approaches differ in many ways. However, three criteria provide useful 
comparative dimensions when considering the use of regulation to enforce 
competition: (1) whether the regulation fills a gap in antitrust—that is, when 
regulation does something antitrust law cannot, or as a practical matter does 
not, doctrinally or institutionally accomplish; (2) effectiveness and 
administrability; and (3) consistency with the pro-competitive principles of 
antitrust policy. With those principles in mind, we turn next to a discussion 
of LHPC and its potential application to digital platforms. 
II. LIGHT HANDED PRO-COMPETITIVE (LHPC) REGULATION 
A. Introduction 
Traditional cost-based regulation of public utilities is widely thought to 
reduce firms’ incentives to lower costs and, perhaps even more importantly, 
2020] Antitrust Enforcement, Regulation, and Digital Platforms 1925 
to reduce both the opportunity and incentive for firms to innovate.49 We 
agree that analogs to cost-based regulation would not be well suited to address 
the competition problems in high tech digital industries, both because of the 
need for technological innovation and because competition is neither entirely 
absent nor static in these industries. However, leaving competition 
management entirely to adjudicative remedies might fail to address 
competitive concerns in digital industries, to the detriment of consumers, 
competitors, and the platforms themselves. 
In particular, we argue that specific regulation of digital platforms could 
create more definite and reliable pathways for increasing competition in the 
markets served by these firms. As we explain below, these types of regulations 
would limit the extent to which dominant digital platforms are able to control 
competition in vertically related or complementary markets, preserve 
incentives for innovation in related markets, increase the competitive impact 
of existing competitors, and reduce barriers to entry. We will refer to this 
type of regulation as “light handed pro-competitive” (LHPC) regulation. As 
we noted in the introduction and will discuss in more detail, the regulation 
we propose attempts neither to base access terms on a firm’s costs nor to 
restrain a firm’s allowable returns. It therefore does not rely upon the 
elaborate mechanisms of public utility regulation, whether those mechanisms 
be directly rate-of-return based or be more incentive-based, like a price-cap 
regime. Instead of replacing competition with monopoly controls, LHPC 
regulation aims to govern firms’ behavior and market power by protecting 
and promoting competition. Its primary goals are to provide competitive 
incentives and to increase the viability of actual and potential competitors. 
To achieve these objectives, the regulatory scheme could require a dominant 
digital platform to provide a baseline level of access (interconnection and 
interoperability), which the regulator determines is necessary to promote 
entry by actual and potential competitors. The primary regulation applied to 
access terms would take the form of prohibiting a dominant platform from 
discriminating among users in access prices (if any) or other terms of access. 
A number of commentators have advocated expanding competition 
enforcement through rulemaking. For example, Tim Wu advocates more 
regulation that he describes as “using industry-specific statutes, rulemakings, 
or other tools of the regulatory state to achieve the traditional competition 
 
49 See, e.g., Tim Wu, Antitrust Via Rulemaking: Competition Catalysts, 16 COLO. TECH. L.J. 33, 
38-40 (2017) (noting criticism of the public utilities approach to regulation and collecting sources); 
see also Kearney & Merrill, supra note 15, at 1397-401 (“Nevertheless, if we confine ourselves to 
considering elite opinion about economic regulation of common carriers and public utilities, there 
can be no doubt that the perceptions of regulatory failure are in the ascendancy, while perceptions 
of market failure are in decline.”). 
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goals associated with the antitrust laws.”50 Rohit Chopra contends that 
“[r]ulemaking would serve to advance clarity and certainty about what types 
of conduct constitute—or do not constitute—an ‘unfair method of 
competition.’”51 While the kind of regulation we suggest might fit within the 
frameworks of what other commentators have suggested, we propose 
something much more limited. We do not advocate the use of the entire 
toolkit of traditional utility regulation, nor do we suggest rulemaking for 
broader, general-purpose antitrust enforcement outside of particular contexts 
where agency expertise is most likely to have advantages over traditional 
adjudication. We focus on why regulation in the particular context of digital 
platforms has comparative advantages over adjudication. We focus on access 
rules, similar to those that regulators have used to promote competition in a 
variety of different industries.52 As we will discuss, the FCC has successfully 
used these types of regulations in various sectors of the telecommunications 
industry to deal with the same general sorts of competition issues that arise 
in digital markets.53  
The kinds of regulation that one might consider for application to digital 
platforms include (1) interconnection and interoperability requirements and 
common standards, (2) limits on discrimination, (3) data portability 
requirements, (4) line-of-business restrictions, and (5) additional restrictions 
on certain business practices currently subject to rule of reason analysis under 
general antitrust statutes. We discuss each of these categories in more detail 
below. However, one issue that applies to all of the categories is worth 
discussing at the outset: whether the regulations should apply industry-
wide—namely, to all digital platforms—or only to dominant platforms. We 
think that in most cases it will only be necessary to apply these regulations to 
firms that the regulator determines are dominant. This means that a key part 
of the regulatory regime will be creating and applying standards to determine 
whether a firm is in fact a “dominant” digital provider. Note also that, in many 
cases, the obligations imposed on dominant digital providers will take the 
form of requiring the dominant provider to conform to various common 
standards, in order to reduce switching costs to users or to enable non-
dominant firms to interconnect or interoperate with dominant providers. In 
this case, although the standards will not be mandatory for non-dominant 
providers, those providers will nonetheless likely conform to the standards to 
take advantage of the protections offered by the regulation. 
 
50 Id. at 34. 
51 CHOPRA COMMENT, supra note 11, at 9. 
52 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 15, at 1326, 1349-58, 1364 (discussing the regulation of the 
railroad, trucking, telecommunication, gas and electricity industries). 
53 See infra subsection II.B.2. (discussing limitations on discrimination designed to address 
competition in the telecommunications industry). 
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B. Potential Types of Regulation 
1. Interconnection/Interoperability Requirements and Common Standards 
Interconnection and interoperability requirements would establish 
obligations for dominant digital platforms to provide certain kinds of access 
to actual and potential rivals. These third parties consist of firms competing 
in the digital platform’s primary line-of-business as well as a broader 
ecosystem of firms that produce complementary products or rely on the 
dominant platform’s services as inputs into their own businesses. Providing 
such access could allow competitors to share in the network effects of the 
dominant provider, reduce both the incumbent’s installed base advantage and 
consumers’ switching costs, and help protect firms from exclusionary conduct 
through which a dominant platform might extend its market power. 
Requiring dominant platforms to follow certain open standards could make 
it easier for other firms to interoperate and interconnect with dominant firms 
as well as reduce switching costs. 
Precisely what form these types of regulation should take will differ from 
industry to industry and require specific knowledge of underlying economic 
and technological facts. It is easy to say that competitors or complementary 
product developers should have platform access sufficient to overcome true 
barriers to entry related to scale, network effects, and installed base, but that 
does not mean they should necessarily have access to all technological 
capabilities of the incumbent platform. While complete access to dominant 
firms might superficially appear to increase the intensity of competition, it 
dampens the incentives for competitors and the regulated platform to invest 
and innovate in ways that could provide the most value to consumers.54 In 
determining the scope of interconnection or interoperability, for example 
through access to application programming interfaces (APIs) on the platform, 
a regulatory authority will need to consider complex tradeoffs. After making 
such determinations, authorities might well decide that they should mandate 
no such access. On the other hand, if lack of interconnection is preserving 
incumbent market power and harming competition, some intervention could 
improve competitive outcomes and consumer welfare. 
If intervention is the chosen solution, we must then address the question 
of who should make hard calls about the specific scope of interconnection and 
interoperability requirements. For reasons discussed above, adjudicating 
those questions before generalist courts has advantages and disadvantages. 
Regulation by expert agencies, comparatively, may be appropriate when 
 
54 See CRÉMER ET AL., supra note 2, at 59 (describing the potential for firms that are required 
to coordinate to then collude, thereby limiting innovation). 
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intervention requires a coherent set of detailed rules involving technically 
complex issues. This is especially true when rules must change over time in 
response to evolving technical knowledge and changing circumstances.55 The 
regulatory approach is worth pursuing when the alternative to carefully 
thought out rules provides either no solution or a piecemeal, under-
considered remedy. 
For three reasons, we believe that once regulators determine baseline 
access requirements that incumbents must meet, effectively implementing 
those requirements will not entail the significant burdens or information 
asymmetries of rules that require regulators to assess the dominant firm’s 
costs and align interconnection terms with those costs. First, regulators can 
blunt a dominant firm’s ability to leverage its market power to enter or extract 
rents from related lines of business by requiring that the firm not discriminate 
in providing platform access, even if regulation does not directly control the 
terms of such access. 
Second, in many cases it seems likely to us that the marginal cost of 
providing interconnection would be at or near zero.56 In these cases, a 
regulator could require interconnection without establishing any elaborate 
regulatory cost-tracking or cost-monitoring system. The key terms of access 
are likely to involve technical issues that have nothing to do with the 
platform’s costs or profits. To be sure, access to certain platforms does often 
have a price. Apple and Android require most apps to share revenues as part 
of the terms for access to their user bases through their respective app stores.57 
However, in other contexts, the relevant access terms involve technical 
aspects of interoperability with a platform. For example, when third parties 
“interconnect” with a digital platform, they are essentially trying to have their 
machines communicate with the platform’s machines.58 Through that 
 
55 See FELD, supra note 10, at 23, 172, 188-90, 194 (“Congress has generally created a new agency 
when new technology creates a new industry whose complexity requires specialization. Examples 
include the Federal Power Commission (now the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) and the 
Federal Radio Commission (now the Federal Communications Commission).”). 
56 See Khan, supra note 3, at 1079 (noting that “information—once produced—can be 
disseminated online to large groups at negligible costs”). 
57 Mark  Bergen,  Google   is   Offering  App  Developers  the  Same  Revenue-Sharing  Terms   Apple  Just  
Announced—With   One   Big   Advantage,   VOX   (June  8,  2016,  5:19  PM),          https://www.vox.com 
/2016/6/8/11889298/google-apple-subscription-app-revenue-share          [https://perma.cc/859L-YHER] 
(describing Apple and Google’s moves towards an 85/15 revenue-sharing model);  see also   FURMAN ET 
AL.,   supra   note   3,  at   46   (noting   that   Apple   took   a   thirty   percent   commission  “from  app 
developers’ revenues”). 
58 See Tom Wheeler, Did Technology Kill the Truth?, BROOKINGS (Nov. 14, 2017), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/did-technology-kill-the-truth/ [https://perma.cc/Z2EH-DJ 
HN] (explaining that “[a]n API—an Application Programming Interface—is what allows two 
software programs to interact with each other,” and giving as an example how Uber accesses Google 
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communication, third parties can provide their services to the platform’s 
installed base of users; and in return, the third parties can receive data and 
information about those users that helps them to improve their products and 
grow their user base.59 A platform sets the limits and policies for such 
communications through the application programing interfaces, or “APIs”, 
that it provides to third parties.60 Far more important than price—which we 
think in the context of digital platforms can usually be set at zero with little 
distortion of incentives—will be what kinds of services, data, and network 
functionality third-party application developers can send into, and take out 
of, the platform through the APIs. These latter questions will be the key focus 
of regulators if they establish an interoperability and interconnection regime 
for digital platforms. 
Third, even if it turns out that there is some need to establish non-zero 
interconnection fees, the regulator could require parties that do not reach 
agreement about what these fees should be to accept binding third-party 
arbitration to determine a fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory access price 
as an alternative to imposing full-blown cost-based regulation. Third-party 
arbitration could also be an alternative to courts for settling disputes 
regarding access terms other than price—as is the case for addressing disputes 
over digital music licensing under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,61 
for example. Arbitration is similarly an alternative to oversight of terms by 
the regulator—as Congress required of the FCC on access and 
interconnection under the Telecommunications Act of 1996.62 Arbitration 
could provide a more efficient and light-handed alternative. The regulator 
could require parties to accept binding, third-party arbitration if parties 
sought to challenge the sufficiency of regulated access terms, dispute aspects 
of access not covered by the regulation, or disagreed over whether one side or 
the other was living up to the conditions of access. Such arbitration provisions 
were a condition of the FCC and DOJ’s approval of Comcast’s acquisition of 
NBC Universal.63 More recently, AT&T voluntarily committed to follow a 
 
Maps’ open API and harnesses Google’s mapping algorithms and location information to implement 
its own location-based algorithms). 
59 Khan, supra note 3, at 1001. 
60 See id. (describing how Facebook offers access to its APIs to other application developers, 
allowing those apps to access data and users from Facebook’s network); Wheeler, supra note 58 
(describing how Google allows applications like Uber to access Google Maps’ API). 
61 See 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(1) (2018) (outlining the role of Copyright Royalty Judges in resolving 
rate disputes in music royalties and licensing). 
62 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 251–252 (2018) (providing that the FCC shall establish regulations to 
promote interconnection and the development of competitive markets, as well as ensure that 
telecommunications providers are fulfilling their obligations under the statute). 
63 Applications of Comcast Corp., Gen. Elec. Co. & NBC Universal, Inc., for Consent to 
Assign Licenses and Transfer Control of Licenses, 26 FCC Rcd. 4238, 4259 (2011) (Memorandum 
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similar scheme in its merger with Time Warner, and the district court cited 
this as one of the factors that supported its decision to allow the merger over 
the DOJ’s objections.64 
While a challenging enterprise, we think setting baseline standards for 
access and interconnection is much more manageable than traditional 
monopoly-control regulation. The relevant question, though, is not whether 
setting access terms can be difficult. Once policy makers determine that 
healthy competition depends on such access, the relevant question is whether 
an expert regulator can better determine when, and on what terms, to grant 
such access than can a generalist adjudicator. As already discussed, the latter 
institutional approach on one hand has the theoretical possibility of adjusting 
remedies to specific circumstances but on the other hand lacks detailed 
industry knowledge and faces doctrinal constraints against imposing access 
remedies in the first place.65 If the outcome from traditional adjudication will 
be under-enforcement or less well-informed remedies, then regulation could 
have considerable advantages despite its challenges. 
2. Limits on Discrimination 
If regulation imposes access to, or interoperability with, an incumbent 
platform, a regulation prohibiting discrimination would require the platform 
to offer such access or interconnection on the same terms to all relevant third 
parties, including partially or wholly owned affiliates. While a regulation that 
limits discrimination requires a firm to charge the same price to all users, it 
need not attempt to set the absolute level of the price that the firm charges. 
Therefore, regulation prohibiting discrimination can be much less intrusive 
and more light-handed than full-blown cost-based regulation. 
A nondiscrimination requirement can help achieve two desirable 
outcomes. First, a nondiscrimination rule can prevent a dominant platform 
from leveraging its market power into industries that rely on the platform, 
 
Opinion and Order) (describing the “baseball-style” arbitration that Comcast adopted); Press 
Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Allows Comcast-NBCU 
Joint Venture to Proceed with Conditions (Jan. 18, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-
department-allows-comcast-nbcu-joint-venture-proceed-conditions [https://perma.cc/YKW2-FN 
UW] (“The FCC order also . . . includes an arbitration mechanism for resolving disputes. . . . The 
FCC order also allows Comcast’s traditional competitors . . . to invoke arbitration at the FCC to 
resolve program access and retransmission consent disputes.”). 
64 Specifically, defendants offered empirical evidence to show that the Comcast/NBCU transaction 
had not resulted in significant price increases of the sort predicted by the government’s theory of harm. The 
district court concluded that this evidence could “be afforded probative weight in predicting the potential 
pricing effects of the [AT&T/Time Warner] merger” because AT&T had voluntarily committed to abide 
by a similar third-party binding arbitration provision to that imposed on Comcast/NBCU as a merger 
condition. United States v. AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 217 (D.D.C. 2018). 
65 See supra Sections I.A., I.E. 
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because a nondiscrimination rule requires the dominant platform to offer the 
same terms of access to independent third-party businesses that it offers to 
itself or to affiliated businesses. Therefore, a dominant platform would be 
unable to advantage itself or its own affiliates,66 protecting the ability of 
dependent third parties to compete. Furthermore, and perhaps even more 
importantly, firms that initially complement the platform might ultimately 
create new products that substitute for the incumbent.67 Preventing the 
incumbent platform from leveraging market power in its primary line of 
business into related product lines preserves those related sectors as a source 
of potential entrants and innovators. 
Second, a nondiscrimination rule can prevent a dominant platform from 
extracting excessive rents68 from dependent industries, which preserves 
incentives for innovation for firms in those dependent industries. The 
reasoning here is slightly more subtle. The ability of a dominant platform to 
extract all rents from a dependent industry requires the platform to 
discriminate among its different potential users based not upon what services 
the users require, but upon how valuable the services are to the user.69 
Requiring a platform to make the same service available to all users on the 
same terms will restrict the ability of a dominant platform to extract rents 
from developers with particularly profitable applications, either by charging 
higher prices to those users or extracting more onerous terms.70 What this 
 
66 See, e.g., Applications of Comcast Corp., Gen. Elec. Co. & NBC Universal, Inc., for Consent 
to Assign Licenses and Transfer Control of Licenses, 26 FCC Rcd. 4238, 4240-41 (2011) (describing 
nondiscrimination provisions, including that Comcast-NBCU take measures to ensure comparable 
access to its affiliated content and video programming and limit its ability to make agreements that 
would restrict the online distribution of such materials). 
67 See, e.g., AUSTL. COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMM’N, supra note 8, at 134 (“The search 
engine, DuckDuckGo has made public complaints that each time it updates its Chrome browser 
extension, all of its users are presented with a dialogue box asking them if they’d like to revert their 
search settings back to Google Search and disable the entire extension.”); see also Khan, supra note 
3, at 981 (“[D]iscrimination, moreover, is especially harmful in digital platform markets, given the 
important role platforms play as innovation catalysts.”). 
68 Joseph T. Mahoney & J. Rahendran Pandian, The Resource-Based View Within the 
Conversation of Strategic Management, 13 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 363, 364 (citations omitted) 
(“Strategy can be viewed as a ‘continuing search for rent,’ where rent is defined as return in excess 
of a resource owner’s opportunity costs. . . . The generation of above-normal rates of return (i.e. 
rents) is the focus of analysis for competitive advantage.”). 
69 See id., (citations omitted) (“The existence and maintenance of rents depend upon a lack of 
competition in either acquiring or developing complementary resources. Rents derived from 
services of durable resources that are relatively important to customers and are simultaneously 
superior, imperfectly imitable, and imperfectly substitutable, will not be appropriated if they are 
nontradeable or traded in imperfect factor-markets.”); see also FURMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 111 
(“At the extreme, personalised pricing could lead to each customer being offered an individual price 
based on what the business infers they are willing to pay.”). 
70 See FURMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 111 (noting that a U.S. Council of Economic Advisers 
report found that personalized pricing practices may be remedied by antidiscrimination laws); see 
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“price” might be in a non-price environment will depend on the particular 
context, but the concept would remain applicable. Since high value users of 
platform access will include innovators that discover unusually good ways to 
use the services of the dominant platform, such a rule will automatically 
provide some protection to innovators with particularly good ideas. While 
such protection is only partial, it is also light-handed compared to directly 
regulating the terms of access. 
The FCC’s nondiscrimination rules for the video programming and 
distribution industries provide an example of successful regulation to prevent 
a dominant firm from leveraging its market power into adjacent markets.71 
The video programming and distribution industry consists of upstream video 
programmers that produce TV channels and downstream pay-TV providers 
that distribute this programming to subscribers.72 The FCC’s so-called 
program access regulations require vertically integrated programmers to 
make their programming available to pay-TV providers at nondiscriminatory 
rates, but place no restriction on the overall level of rates.73 Similarly, so-
called program carriage regulations require vertically integrated pay-TV 
providers to offer nondiscriminatory carriage terms to all video programmers, 
but place no restriction on carriage terms other than requiring that they be 
nondiscriminatory.74 Both regimes are widely thought to have prevented large 
firms with dominant positions in one of the two levels of the industry from 
leveraging their market power into another level. For example, in the 1970s 
cable operators were the only pay-TV providers and produced a number of 
the most important cable networks. Program access rules enabled the entry 
of Direct Broadcast Satellite providers and telephone companies into the pay-
 
also Khan, supra note 3, at 979-80 (noting that requirements of “equal access on equal terms” “respond 
. . . to problems of discrimination”). 
71 For an overview and history of these rules, see Jennifer Scullion, Program Access and Program 
Carriage: Nearly 25 Years In, Where Do the Fraternal Twins of Video Programming Distribution Stand? 
(pt. 1), ENT. & SPORTS L., Winter 2016, at 2 [hereinafter Scullion, Program Access and Program 
Carriage (Part 1)], and Jennifer Scullion, Program Access and Program Carriage: Nearly 25 Years In, 
Where Do the Fraternal Twins of Video Programming Stand? (pt. 2), ENT. & SPORTS L., Summer 2016, 
at 3 [hereinafter Scullion, Program Access and Program Carriage (Part 2)]. 
72 See Scullion, Program Access and Program Carriage (Part 1), supra note 71, at 2-3 (noting the 
complexity of this system and the breadth of authority given to the FCC to oversee the effects of 
vertical integration). 
73 Id. at 4-5 (describing the prohibition against discrimination under the Communications Act 
of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 548, and explaining the methods the FCC uses to determine whether 
discrimination has occurred). 
74 See Scullion, Program Access and Program Carriage (Part 2), supra note 71, at 3-4 (describing 
the program carriage regime, including the FCC’s implementing regulations). 
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TV industry by requiring cable operators to make their programming 
available to rival providers at reasonable rates.75 
3. Data Portability 
Data portability regulation might require a dominant digital platform to 
allow its users to take data with them if they switch providers or allow 
competitive application providers to obtain some of the incumbent’s customer 
data. The question of when data portability should be required, and of what 
data and information should be portable, are beyond the scope of this Article. 
Those questions aside, however, under the right circumstances data 
portability could have competitive benefits. In addition to helping reduce 
consumers’ switching costs, data portability could enable increased reach and 
traction by third-party providers, thus increasing the commercial viability of 
existing firms who provide competing and complementary services while 
reducing barriers to entry for new firms.76 
Regulations designed to increase competition by reducing switching costs 
have had notable success in the telecommunications industry. In particular, 
in 2003 the FCC introduced regulations that allowed mobile telephone 
subscribers to take their telephone number with them when they switched 
mobile telephone providers, thereby significantly reducing the costs of 
switching providers. This is widely thought to have increased levels of 
competition in mobile telephony.77 
When it comes to large digital platforms, however, it bears noting that 
data portability raises difficult questions. For example, if consumers can port 
their personal profiles to a rival platform, should those profiles contain 
consumers’ contact lists? Or, should each of the people on a contact list have 
a right separately to withhold their information from portability? The 
questions of who owns what data and of who can consent to having certain 
data ported and shared are very difficult ones. While mere invocation of 
“privacy” should not insulate a platform from providing some data portability, 
the question of what degree of data portability is reasonable and consistent 
 
75 See Review of the Commission’s Program Access Rules and Examination of Programming 
Tying Arrangements, 25 FCC Rcd. 746, 749 (2010) (First Report and Order) (“[Program access] 
rules are a success. While competitors to incumbent cable operators served less than five percent of 
video subscribers nationwide when the program access provision of the 1992 Cable Act was 
passed . . . that percentage has increased to over 30 percent today. Competitors to incumbent cable 
operators widely credit the program access rules for this increase in competition.”). 
76 See, e.g., FURMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 64-66 (describing the “pro-competitive, pro-entry” 
nature and consumer benefits of personal data mobility). 
77 See generally Minjung Park, The Economic Impact of Wireless Number Portability, 59 J. INDUS. 
ECON. 714, 715 (2011) (arguing that wireless number portability reduced wireless prices in the United 
States); Lyons, supra note 4 (presenting similar evidence for a number of other countries). 
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with privacy policies is a challenging one. Competition enforcement should 
not leave platforms stuck between conflicting policy objectives. One benefit 
of a regulatory approach to data portability is, therefore, that it could provide 
guidelines for platforms about how to comply with different, and sometimes 
inconsistent, legal or public-policy objectives. 
4. Line-of-Business Restrictions 
As discussed above, there are good reasons to consider regulations that 
limit the extent to which a dominant digital provider can leverage its market 
power into the related ecosystem of industries that rely on its services or 
produce complements. The first reason is to preserve the benefits of increased 
competition in these markets. The second reason is to preserve and nurture a 
source of potential entrants and innovators that might eventually challenge 
the dominant provider in its primary industry. 
An alternative, or supplemental, approach might be to establish line-of-
business restrictions for the dominant provider that prohibit the dominant 
firm from expanding into certain related lines of business. One problem with 
such regulation is that it may eliminate opportunities to create efficiencies by 
combining lines of business in a single firm. In addition to operational 
efficiencies, innovation can require coordination across both lines of business 
that occurs most effectively within a single firm.78 Additional problems will 
arise if the line between the primary product and related products is 
somewhat blurred. The line between the monopoly service and complements 
is not always crisp; the monopolist might innovate in ways that add 
capabilities to its core product or service, some of which might begin to cross 
the line into forbidden territory. Not only is policing that line burdensome, 
but policing it too strictly would limit development of the monopoly service 
in ways that could harm consumers.79 When it is hard to determine if an 
innovative new product or service is part of the dominant firm’s primary line 
of business (that it is allowed to produce), or is a related product (that it is 
prohibited from producing), line-of-business restrictions can limit the ability 
of the regulated firm to create value for its customers.80 At a minimum, 
determining precisely which sorts of product improvements and extensions 
 
78 See, e.g., FURMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 40 (“[M]ost acquisitions made by digital companies 
are likely to be benign or beneficial to consumers due to efficiencies, and the potential for innovative 
products and services to be brought more quickly to market.”). 
79 See Khan, supra note 3, at 1085 (noting that “it is possible that limiting a network 
monopolist’s ability to compete on its own network would sacrifice certain cost savings, resulting in 
higher prices”). 
80 See id. at 1085-88 (noting additional costs posed by separation such as limiting platform 
innovation and discouraging “entrepreneurial investment”). 
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qualify as permissible for the dominant firm to offer would entail ongoing 
administrative costs. 
To make the problem of policing the line between allowable and 
prohibited lines of business more complicated, a regulated platform might 
not itself enter into a line of business but might have agreements or joint 
projects with a firm that is in that business. If such arrangements could lead 
to joint investments or tailoring of technology that make the monopolist’s 
product and the complementary product work better together, disallowing all 
such cooperation between the monopolist and firms in the prohibited line of 
business might reduce opportunities to provide benefits to consumers.81 
Regulators therefore must choose between a hardline rule with some 
inevitable costs from foregone product improvement or incurring the 
increased costs of an administrative process for granting exceptions. Such 
administrative processes can become unwieldy: from 1984 to 1996, a single 
United States district court ruled on hundreds of petitions over 
implementation of the AT&T consent decree’s provisions.82 
Another problem with line-of-business restrictions is that they are in tension 
with core principles of competition policy. As a general matter, competition 
policy favors entry into new markets. Such entry can benefit consumers even if 
the entrant is large or dominant in a different market.83 Competition enforcers 
typically address any unwanted spillovers of market power not through entry 
 
81 See id. at 1085-86 (“Prohibiting dominant platforms from competing in markets that the 
platform operates would reduce platform investment in certain platform-adjacent markets. Insofar 
as directly competing with complementors can generate for a dominant platform additional profits, 
uniquely valuable business intelligence, and greater leverage over complementors, closing off this 
avenue of business could reduce platform profits, diminishing the platform’s incentive to invest.”). 
82 Joseph D. Kearney, From the Fall of the Bell System to the Telecommunications Act: Regulation of 
Telecommunications Under Judge Greene, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1395, 1399 n.11 (1999). 
83 As noted by the Report of the Digital Competition Expert Panel, 
Competition policy promotes the economic benefits that competition between 
different businesses can bring for consumers, businesses and markets. This means 
ensuring that prices stay low, goods and services are high quality, and consumers have 
a good range of choices and innovation thrives. Competition also drives productivity, 
compelling firms to use their resources efficiently, allocating market share and 
resources to the most productive firms, incentivising firms to invest and innovate over 
time, and enabling productive new entrants to emerge and grow. 
. . . . 
Competition policy does not act against organic growth by a successful company 
that takes a larger share of the market because, all else equal, this is positive, reflecting 
greater efficiencies that benefit consumers. Holding a dominant position is therefore 
not illegal, but certain actions which create or abuse dominance can be. 
FURMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 85. 
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prohibitions but through enforcement against tying, bundling, predatory 
pricing, and other mechanisms of anticompetitive conduct.84 
We think it a fair generalization that contemporary competition policy 
rightfully prefers entry, even with the risk of spillover effects, over entry 
prohibitions that reduce competition altogether. For this reason, if regulators 
use line-of-business restrictions at all, they should do so only where the 
competitive benefits from the monopolist’s entry would be low, the risk that 
such entry will harm competition is high, and the likely efficiency gains from 
coordination between the monopoly and complementary products are small 
compared to the expected costs of anticompetitive discrimination. We think 
that these criteria leave, at best, very limited room to apply line-of-business 
restrictions to digital platforms without risking significant additional 
problems of the sort described above. In the dynamic technological 
environment of digital platforms, where the nature of products and services 
is constantly changing, restrictions on what sorts of goods and services a 
dominant digital provider can produce would be hard to administer and 
would likely interfere with the pace and direction of innovation that would 
benefit consumers.85 
5. Additional Restrictions on Business Practices Currently Subject to Rule 
of Reason Analysis under Antitrust Statutes 
This last category of restrictions involves other forms of conduct that 
antitrust law recognizes as double-edged: they could increase or maintain 
monopoly power, but also create efficiencies that benefit consumers. Antitrust 
law applies rule of reason analysis to such behaviors by attempting to weigh 
the potentially negative effects of the behavior against the positive effects, 
then prohibiting the behavior only if the net effect is likely to be negative.86 
Of course, any quantitative measure of the net effect of a practice is uncertain, 
and therefore standards of proof and evidentiary burdens play a large role in 
determining the actual outcomes of cases. 
The general point we wish to make in this Section is that, where digital 
platform markets are prone to tip to durable monopoly, the presumptions and 
burdens that courts ordinarily apply under antitrust law’s general rule of 
reason might fail to prevent anticompetitive harms or to provide useful 
 
84 See id. (noting that cartel behavior and certain anticompetitive vertical agreements may be illegal). 
85 For a more positive assessment of line-of-business restrictions, see Khan, supra note 3, at 
1065-90, where Lina Khan claims “[a]pplying a separations regime . . . will involve unavoidable 
uncertainties. But this uncertainty is not a compelling argument for inaction.” 
86 See CHOPRA COMMENT, supra note 11, at 2 (criticizing the rule of reason standard); 
Vaheesan, supra note 11, at 667 (contrasting standard-oriented analysis used for the rule of reason 
with the rule-oriented analysis used for presumptive illegality). 
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industry guidance. Such settings could be better governed by a more specific 
and definitive set of standards implemented through an agency better able to 
understand and account for relevant industry details. To the extent such 
regulation could lead to fewer errors of either over- or under-enforcement 
against digital platforms, it could be welfare enhancing compared to 
traditional antitrust adjudication. For example, regulation might prohibit 
certain conduct under specified conditions where it will be predictably 
harmful, establish stronger presumptions about the harms from particular 
conduct when undertaken by digital platforms, or implement stricter 
requirements for the review of specific business activities. 
One area of activity where regulation might have advantages over 
adjudication is acquisition of nascent competitors. Several commentators 
have advocated stricter prohibitions against such deals on grounds that large 
firms might, through acquisitions, buy up the very start-ups that today look 
so insignificant as to escape merger review but would later prove to be serious 
competitors.87 It is beyond the scope of this article to address the emerging 
work on acquisitions of start-ups. We note, however, that the question of 
nascent acquisitions poses a serious challenge for antitrust enforcement. 
Generalist courts seem poorly suited to deciding, case-by-case, whether a 
particular firm that might today have little market presence or infrastructure 
might later emerge as a competitor to its buyer, especially if the nascent firm 
is currently more of a complement than competitor to the acquiring firm. The 
technical, economic, and industry factors that make competitive-effect 
determinations difficult in any merger case are particularly important in a 
technologically dynamic industry where one of the merging firms is new and 
evolving. Moreover, the alternative of waiting to see the results of a particular 
merger so that courts have a record on which to review the transaction creates 
very substantial incentive and evidentiary problems. A successful merger is 
one in which the parties integrate in such a way that creates commercial 
growth,88 and therefore it will be very difficult to distinguish commercial 
success due to the merger from the counterfactual of success that would have 
resulted had the parties remained separate. Additionally, the prospect of post-
 
87 See, e.g., C. Scott Hemphill, Disruptive Incumbents: Platform Competition in an Age of Machine 
Learning, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1973, 1974 (2019) (arguing that the acquisition of “nascent 
competitors” is monopolization in violation of the Sherman Act); Colleen Cunningham, Florian 
Ederer & Song Ma, Killer Acquisitions 1-7 (Apr. 19, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3241707 [https://perma.cc/8HPN-BK26] 
(finding that “killer acquisitions”—the acquisition of a nascent competitor—are both “strategic and 
intentional”). 
88 See William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the Integration of 
Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 207, 243 (2003) (“If the 
integrated firm produces as efficiently as the separate firms, then integration makes both producers 
and consumers better off.”). 
1938 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 168: 1911 
consummation review of a merger, with retroactive remedies or prohibitions, 
could deter the very investment in integration that helps ensure a successful 
merger.89 These concerns lead us to suggest that the process and criteria 
through which antitrust law applies to acquisitions of nascent competitors by 
large industry players might better lend itself to guidance and administration 
through a regulatory entity as opposed to the generalist adjudicatory process. 
While we do not think banning such acquisitions is a good idea, rules that 
specify which transactions the agency will review, what criteria and 
presumptions it will apply in a particular industry, and what kind of evidence 
it will find relevant could provide more certainty for businesses and better 
protections for consumers. 
Regulation might address two other types of anticompetitive behavior 
that cause concerns about digital platforms. The first type is the use of 
exclusive dealing provisions or loyalty rebates that require or incentivize users 
to adhere to the dominant platform. It is widely recognized that any practice 
that requires or encourages users to single-home instead of multi-home will 
reduce competition.90 The second type of behavior is the use of most favored 
nation clauses (MFN) that make it more difficult for potential competitors 
to challenge the dominant provider. For example, in the case of platforms that 
help businesses reach customers (such as a travel site that lists hotel 
accommodations), a MFN by a dominant platform that prohibits businesses 
from offering better terms on other platforms can limit the ability of potential 
competitors to challenge the incumbent.91 
Some commentators have argued that general antitrust law should place 
tighter restrictions on the aforementioned conduct in all markets.92 Even if 
 
89 See CRÉMER ET AL., supra note 2, at 10 (“While it is important to ensure that potentially 
anticompetitive transactions are duly scrutinised by competition authorities, one also has to consider 
the market need for legal certainty, as well as the need to minimise the additional administrative 
burden and transaction costs which an extension of jurisdiction would trigger.”). 
90 See, e.g., Giulio Federico, Fiona Scott Morton & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust and Innovation: 
Welcoming and Protecting Disruption, in 20 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 125, 158 (Josh 
Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2020) (“In platform markets, conduct aimed at hindering multihoming 
on one side of the market may be a particularly effective exclusionary strategy. Multihoming is a 
strategy that encourages innovation competition because it raises contestability: consumers 
operating on more than one platform can more easily shift share to a more innovative product.”); 
FURMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 37 (“Switching and multi-homing by users of platforms can be the 
antidote to strong network effects.”). 
91 See Jonathan B. Baker & Fiona Scott Morton, Antitrust Enforcement Against Platform MFNs, 
127 YALE L.J. 2176, 2180 (2018) (noting that the result of this restraint on potential competitors could 
be lower prices). For an additional discussion of the competition effects of platform MFNs, see 
BAKER, supra note 1, at 136-37, and Ariel Ezrachi, The Competitive Effects of Parity Clauses on Online 
Commerce, 11 EUR. COMPETITION L.J. 488, 488-90 (2015). 
92 See, e.g., Baker & Scott Morton, supra note 91, at 2195-201 (describing restrictions on MFNs 
in the United States); Federico, Scott Morton & Shapiro, supra note 90, at 158-59 (describing 
restrictions on conduct designed to induce users to adhere to a dominant platform). 
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this were the case, change in general purpose antitrust statutes has historically 
been a slow process. A more narrowly targeted regulatory process would apply 
greater scrutiny to such conduct in particular industry contexts where it is 
most likely to have harmful effects. With a sufficient administrative record to 
survive judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, this 
regulatory process could potentially proceed more quickly than changing 
general purpose antitrust laws. Moreover, specific regulation might have the 
beneficial consequence of providing a good laboratory for understanding the 
costs and benefits of broader statutory changes to antitrust law. If a regulatory 
authority were to introduce regulations placing greater restrictions on certain 
practices, and if this new regime created sensible coherent rules that received 
broad approval, the regulatory regime could influence both legislative efforts 
and the evolution of common-law standards that determine the general 
antitrust treatment of these practices. 
C. Applying General Antitrust Statutes with a “Sliding Scale” vs. Creating 
Stricter Industry Specific Standards 
One might argue that, even if we accept the conclusions that market power 
is more durable in digital platform industries and that there is a need for stricter 
limits on certain types of business practices in these industries, there is still no 
need for industry specific rules and standards. Rather, one could argue that 
because rule of reason analysis under general antitrust statutes should always 
consider industry-specific factors when evaluating the competitive effects of 
business practices, there is no need for industry-specific standards. 
Giulio Federico, Fiona Scott Morton, and Carl Shapiro refer to this as 
applying a “sliding scale” to the evaluation of business practices and suggest 
that this could be at least part of the solution to problems raised by the 
potential durability of market power in digital platform industries. 
Because the nascent competitor’s success can be highly uncertain, for its 
exclusion to have a large effect on expected consumer welfare, the value of 
the increased competition in the event of its success must be large. This is 
most likely to be the case when the incumbent has substantial and durable 
market power. . . . This observation suggests the use of a sliding scale to 
assess the impact of challenged business practices on competition: the greater 
and more durable the incumbent’s market power is, the lower the chance of 
success by the entrant required for that entrant to warrant protection from 
exclusionary conduct.93  
 
93 Federico, Scott Morton & Shapiro, supra note 90, at 159. 
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We agree that courts both can and should take relevant industry-specific 
differences into account when applying general purpose antitrust statutes. We 
also agree that part of antitrust enforcement in digital industries should be to 
encourage courts more fully to take into account specific industry 
characteristics when applying general antitrust statutes. However, questions 
of under what conditions, if any, stricter enforcement is warranted, as well as 
what remedies are appropriate and effective, might be better answered with 
more comprehensive study and review than a court can take in the context of 
a particular adjudication. The slow evolution of the antitrust common law 
could leave cases poorly decided in the absence of a more comprehensive, 
industry-specific process. In the end, stricter enforcement in itself is not the 
objective. We therefore conclude that the regulatory process for developing 
industry-specific approaches to certain types of business practices remains an 
appropriate solution to consider in some cases, and that digital platforms are 
such a case. 
CONCLUSION 
Digital platforms pose a particular challenge for antitrust enforcement. 
Those challenges arise technically and economically from the potential for 
such platforms to rise to dominance, and for that dominance to remain 
durable through the operation of network effects and the dependence of 
competitors and complementary product providers on access to users on the 
incumbent platform. Moreover, particular conduct by the platform might 
affect different kinds of users (for example, advertisers versus end users) in 
different ways, rendering the assessment of net competitive effects more 
complicated than in other settings. The challenges for antitrust arise 
doctrinally from the fact that the theories of harm that might address the 
special features of platform markets, notably obligations to deal with third 
parties, are at the outer boundary of antitrust law and only available in the 
most limited of circumstances that might often not exist in platform markets. 
For these reasons, traditional antitrust adjudication is unlikely to remedy 
the problems of platform markets, or to do so in a blunt way that does not 
apply technical expertise to ensure that remedies are effective and beneficial. 
In this Article, we identify forms of regulation we think could, in the specific 
context of dominant digital platforms, improve on the adjudicative model of 
antitrust enforcement while avoiding the most significant costs and burdens 
of traditional public utility regulation. Through limited and 
nondiscriminatory access and interconnection, digital platforms could 
continue to innovate, compete, and provide network benefits to their users 
while at the same time ensuring that actual and potential competitors can 
enter, gain traction, and expand their appeal to consumers. 
